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I. INTRODUCTION: MINNESOTA, LAND OF 10,000 LAKES1 
Lake access has always been a hotly debated issue in Minnesota.2  
 
 †  J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., Natural Resources 
Management, Spanish, and International Studies, with honors, North Dakota State 
University, 2001. 
 1. Minnesota technically has 11,842 lakes of at least ten acres in size.  Minnesota 
Department of Natural Resources, Lakes, Rivers, and Wetlands, at http://www.dnr.state. 
mn.us/faq/mnfacts/water.html (providing statistics of Minnesota’s lakes) (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2003).  Minnesota’s “10,000 lakes” motto first arose in promotional literature in 
its territorial days as a means of publicizing the state’s outstanding feature.  WILLIAM E. 
LASS, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY 25 (2d ed. 1998) (1977). 
1
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In a recent decision, In re Daniel for the Establishment of a Cartway,3 
the Minnesota Supreme Court added fuel to the fire.  Under a strict 
construction of Minnesota’s cartway statute,4 the Daniel court held that 
lake access suffices for purposes of cartway condemnation.5  The Daniel 
court reached its decision by interpreting the statute in light of the 
legislative intent that existed in 1913.6  Since in 1913 water travel was 
considered a viable means of transportation, the court held that cartway 
condemnation is not appropriate where property borders on navigable 
water.7 
Minnesotans have always taken pride in the vast rivers and lakes 
intricately woven throughout the state.8  This land-water mosaic has 
always been integral to state development.9  Yet regardless of how vital 
Minnesota’s lakes are considered to be, the law must keep apace with the 
dynamic and innovative society it serves.  Today, the typical Minnesotan 
thinks in terms of driving to work, not rowing.10  The Daniel decision 
thus renders Minnesota’s cartway statute obsolete due to modern modes 
of transportation. 
In examining the Daniel decision, this case note begins with the 
historical development of Minnesota’s cartway legislation and an 
 
 2. LASS, supra note 1, at 26-27.  Public access to Minnesota lakes has always been 
a lively issue because the majority of lakeshores fell into private hands long before their 
recreational value was recognized.  Id. 
 3. In re Daniel for the Establishment of a Cartway, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2003) 
[hereinafter Daniel II]. 
 4. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2002).  Historically, a cartway was a rough roadway used 
for carts.  Horton v. Township of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).  
Today, a cartway is merely a classification of a type of public road, unique in character 
because it principally benefits an individual instead of the general public.  39 AM. JUR. 2D 
Cartways § 6 (2002).  This note will refer exclusively to cartways due to the language of 
Minnesota courts.  However, it should be noted that an array of terms is used among 
states in reference to cartways (i.e. private roads, ways of necessity, statutory easements, 
rights-of-way, byroads, and access roads). 
 5. Daniel II, at 546. 
 6. Id. at 545.  The court used the legislative intent in 1913 because that was the 
year the cartway statute was amended to include the key “access” language.  Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. JOHN R. TESTER, MINNESOTA’S NATURAL HERITAGE: AN ECOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 197-265 (Mary Keirstead ed., University of Minnesota Press 1995) 
(describing Minnesota’s lake, river, and stream ecosystems). 
 9. THEODORE C. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 6-7 (2d ed. 1975) 
(1963). 
 10. See Cale v. Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) 
(noting a liberal trend of thought since the 1920s in water access cases due to people 
“driving” and not “rowing” to work). 
2
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overview of the state power utilized in condemning cartways.11  A brief 
comparison is then made between statutory cartways and the typical 
common law easement by necessity.12  A description of the relevant facts 
and reasoning of the Daniel decision follows.13  This note contends that 
the Daniel court correctly limited its decision to one of statutory 
interpretation.14  The court properly interpreted the statute in 
consideration of the state transportation arena that existed in 1913.15  The 
cartway statute and its interpretation are then compared to current water 
access trends in both statutory and common law.16  This note concludes 
that Minnesota’s cartway statute, as interpreted by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, finds itself antiquated and in need of amendment due to 
the transportation needs of today’s society.17 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Birth of Minnesota’s Cartway Statute 
Concepts of cartways can be traced back to Minnesota’s formative 
years.18  Statutory authority to lay roads originated prior to statehood in 
order to promote access throughout the territory.19  Originally, any 
person who owned land without connection to a public road could 
petition the county board to lay out a cartway in order to connect the 
property to a convenient public road.20 The board was then required to 
lay the cartway in a location most beneficial to all who would use it.21  
This statutory language of the territorial legislature is laden with ideas of 
convenience and indicates an objective of expanding Minnesota’s road 
system.  This original language, however, apparently got lost in the 
 
 11. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 12. See infra Part II.C.1-2. 
 13. See infra Part III.A-C. 
 14. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 15. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 16. See infra Part IV.B-D. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. The Minnesota Territory was established by Congress on March 3, 1849. JULIUS 
A. SCHMAHL, Secretary of State, MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 182 (1913). 
Although the state’s first legislature convened December 2, 1857, Minnesota’s act of 
admission was not passed until May 1858.  Id. at 185. 
 19. See MINN. STAT. ch. 11, § 13 (1851) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 164.08 
(2002)). 
 20. Id. (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
3
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statehood shuffle.22 
The territory’s cartway statute is thought to have been superseded 
by a public roads act that was passed in 1857.23  Subsequent to 
statehood, for years only an obscure, discretional authorization to lay 
cartways could be found implicitly in a proviso that specified the 
difference in width requirements of public and private roads.24  The 
proviso briefly stated that county boards had power to lay out cartways 
when petitioned for by town residents.25  The only requirement necessary 
to initiate the board’s discretional authority was that the petitioner 
desired the road.26 
Town and county boards were not again required to act on a petition 
until 1913.27  In 1913, Minnesota’s cartway statute finally began to 
resemble its original pre-statehood version.28  Boards were once again 
required to lay down a cartway to any single landowner who had “no 
 
 22. See Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors, 283 Minn. 288, 291, 167 N.W.2d 497, 499 
(1969) (addressing the “obscure” origin and purpose of the cartway statute). 
 23. See MINN. STAT. ch. 13, § 13 (1851).  The original cartway statute is found in 
Minnesota’s revised statutes of 1851.  Upon achieving statehood in 1858, effort was 
made to formulate a comprehensive compilation of all Minnesota statutes.  This 
compilation of those statutes enacted between 1849 and 1851 proved cumbersome and 
confusing.  Within the compilation, the cartway statute precedes “An Act relating to 
Public Roads,” which makes no mention of laying a statute and which ends by stating 
that “[a]ll public county roads hereafter to be laided out, shall be laid out in accordance 
with the provisions of this act.”  See MINN. STAT. (1849-58).  For this reason, editors of 
the statute compilation specify that although the original chapter was published, the 
subsequent act in large part supersedes it; however, due to lack of clarity the two must be 
read together.  Id. 
 24. See 1873 Minn. Laws ch. 5, § 47 (codified as amended by MINN. STAT. ch. 21, § 
47 (1873)) (specifying public roads were to be four and six rods wide, while cartways 
were to be only two rods in width).  One rod equals 16.5 feet. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1967 (1993).  See also Marchand v. Town of Maple Grove, 
48 Minn. 271, 274, 51 N.W. 606, 607 (1892) (exploring the development of statutory 
roads in dicta). 
 25. 1873 Minn. Laws ch. 5, § 47.  This language was refined, however, by an 1877 
amendment that required a minimum of five petitioners to allow the board to exercise its 
discretional authority.  See 1877 Minn. Laws ch. 50 § 1.  It was also in 1877 when the 
statute first clearly specified that “such cartway[s] . . . shall be deemed a public cartway 
for public use.”  Id. 
 26. MINN. STAT. ch. 21, § 47 (1873). 
 27. All statutes prior to the 1913 amendment were purely grants of discretional 
authority.  See, e.g. MINN. STAT. ch. 21, §47 (1873).  The original 1851 statute, however, 
had required the laying of a cartway whenever there was lack of access to a public road.  
See MINN. STAT. ch. 11, § 13 (1851). 
 28. Authority to lay cartways finally comprised its own section, instead of being 
obscurely mentioned in passing under a section regarding the width of roads.  Compare 
MINN. STAT. § 2542 (1913) with MINN. STAT. § 1832 (1894). 
4
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access thereto except over the lands of others.”29  This exact “no access” 
language has survived and remains in effect today.30  Since its 1913 
rebirth, the cartway statute has undergone few critical changes.31  Today, 
town and county boards are required32 to establish a cartway to connect 
land to a public road whenever a landowner has “no access thereto 
except over the lands of others.”33 
Minnesota is not alone.  Currently, at least twenty-six other states 
have statutes of comparable character.34  While some states have explicit 
 
 29. 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 235, § 55 (codified as amended by MINN. STAT. § 2542 
(1913) (emphasis added)). 
 30. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002). 
Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a tract of land 
containing at least five acres, who has no access thereto except over the lands 
of others, or whose access thereto is less than two rods in width, the town 
board by resolution shall establish a cartway at least two rods wide 
connecting the petitioner’s land with a public road. 
MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002). 
 31. Historically, a landowner had to own at least five acres of land.  MINN. STAT. § 
2542 (1913).  Today, however, an owner of land at least two but less then five acres can 
petition for mandatory establishment of a cartway providing the land was on record as a 
separate parcel as of January 1, 1998. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002). 
 32. MINN. STAT. § 645.44 subd. 16 (2002) (stating “shall” is mandatory). 
 33. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(a) (2002).  An alternative means to receive a 
mandatory cartway is to establish that access exists, but is less than two rods wide.  Id. 
 34. Minnesota is unique, however, in distinctly authorizing both permissive and 
mandatory cartway establishment.  See MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 1-2 (2002).  New 
York is the only other state recognizing each type of authority.  Compare N.Y. REAL 
PROP. LAW § 335-a (McKinney 2002) with N.Y. HIGH. LAW § 300 (McKinney 2002).  
The remainder of states recognizing statutory cartways are fairly split.  Some 
jurisdictions recognize purely mandatory authorizations.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-
66-401 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2002); 
IND. CODE § 32-32-3-1 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 247.211 (2002) (applying only to 
those isolated lands platted or subdivided for residential purposes); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
136-68 (2002); 36 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2731 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 31-
22-1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-14-101 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 24-9-101 
(Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 9).  Other jurisdictions recognize 
purely discretionary authority.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 23-1-130 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 12-1202 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-40 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-117; KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.350 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3022 
(West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-7-201 (2002) (amended by 2003 Miss. Laws 535); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-107 (2002); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 39-1713 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-21 (Michie 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
24-07-06 (2002) (amended by 2003 N.D. Laws 223); OR. REV. STAT. § 376.155 (2002); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 8.24.010 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 80.13 (2002).  Massachusetts has 
specifically prohibited statutory cartways upon registered land, which is part of a unique 
minority.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 185, § 53 (West 1991 & Supp. 2003).  But see 
MINN. STAT. § 508.25 (2002) (excepting all rights in public highways from certificates of 
title). 
5
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cartway statutes, others authorize cartway condemnation simply by 
acknowledging that it is a valid exercise of the state’s power of eminent 
domain.35 
B.  The Power to Condemn 
States have condemned36 cartways by eminent domain since 
colonial times.37  Eminent domain entitles the state to take private 
property, without the owner’s consent, so long as the taking serves a 
public purpose.38  The state’s power is far from infinite, however, and it 
is curtailed in two aspects.  There must exist a public use39 and the owner 
of taken property must receive just compensation.40  In Minnesota, 
cartways are distinguishable from the majority of takings jurisprudence 
because compensation is owed not from the government, but from the 
private individual petitioning the cartway.41  On this basis, a well-
founded concern may arise because it appears as though private 
 
 35. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240 (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-
102 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 7-701 (Michie 2002); IOWA CODE § 6A.4 (2002); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 40A-3 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 6 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815 
(Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 161). 
 36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 287 (7th ed. 1999) (defining condemnation as “[t]he 
determination and declaration that certain property . . . is assigned to public use, subject 
to reasonable compensation; the exercise of eminent domain”). 
 37. 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.07[4][i] (rev. 3d ed. 
2003).  “A private road statute was enacted in Plymouth Colony in 1671.”  Id. at § 
7.07[4][i] n.90. 
 38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999) (defining eminent domain as 
“[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, 
esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the 
taking”).  See also SACKMAN, supra note 37, at § 7.01[1]. 
 39. Minnesota has long established that the state legislature cannot authorize the 
taking of private property for private use.  See, e.g., In re Schubert, 102 Minn. 442, 444-
45, 114 N.W. 244, 245 (1907) (declaring any statute authorizing condemnation of private 
property for a use not of a public nature to be void); Sanborn v. Van Duyne, 90 Minn. 
215, 223, 96 N.W. 41, 42-43 (1903) (stating neither legislature nor constitution can 
authorize the taking of private property for a private use; such authorization would be 
unconstitutional and void).  The doctrine of public use is equally well-established in 
federal courts.  See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
 40. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.  Minnesota’s Takings Clause mandates that “[p]rivate 
property shall not be taken, destroyed, or damaged for public use without just 
compensation therefor, first paid or secured.”  Id.  Minnesota citizens are similarly 
protected under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is made 
applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 41. See MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(c) (2002).  The petitioner of a cartway must 
compensate the landowner for all resulting damages.  MINN. STAT. § 164.08 subd. 2(c) 
(2002). 
6
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individuals are capable of utilizing state power to obtain a private road 
for personal benefit.42 
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the 
constitutionality of cartway statutes.43  The Minnesota Supreme Court, 
however, has specifically validated that the laying of a cartway is a 
public use for purposes of constitutional legitimacy.44  The declared 
purpose of a cartway petition is to allow individuals ingress to and egress 
from their private property.45  Minnesota courts fulfill the public use 
 
 42. See Brian R. Harris, Note, Private Road or Public Use? The Landlocked 
Property Dilemma: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis of Private Road Acts, 80 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 149, 159-60 (2002) (highlighting the argument that private road acts 
are unconstitutional).  Several states have amended their cartway statutes to refer to the 
affected roads as “public” instead of “private,” perhaps to clarify any misconception of 
usage.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 6A.4 (2002) (“public way”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 
§ 3021 (West 2002) (“public easement”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-07-06 (1943) (as 
amended by 2003 N.D. Laws 223) (“public road”). 
 43. SACKMAN, supra note 37, at § 7.07[4][i].  Marinclin v. Urling is the only federal 
case that has addressed the constitutionality of private road acts.  262 F. Supp. 733 (D.C. 
Pa. 1967), aff’d, 384 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1967).  The district court held that a Pennsylvania 
statute authorizing the taking of land by eminent domain to establish a private road did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 736.  The United States Supreme Court, 
however, has established that strong deferential treatment is owed to any legislative 
decision regarding what constitutes a public use.  See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26, 32 (1954); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (stating that as long as there has existed a rational 
nexus between the exercise of eminent domain and a public purpose, the Court has never 
held a legislative determination unconstitutional). 
 44. Mueller v. Supervisors of Courtland, 117 Minn. 290, 295-96, 135 N.W. 996, 
997-98 (1912).  Although Minnesota has validated the constitutionality of the cartway, 
debate over the use of the state’s power of eminent domain to establish a cartway is 
deeply rooted in cartway jurisprudence.  Although some states align with Minnesota, 
recognizing cartways to be private in name only, several states have held such statutes to 
be unconstitutional for failing to serve a public use.  See SACKMAN, supra note 37, at § 
7.07[4][i].  Many states have solidified the issue by amending their state constitutions to 
declare the creation of private roads to be a valid public use.  Id.  These states include 
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.  Id.  
Two recent decisions, however, verify that this vivid constitutional debate is far from 
over.  See Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163, 167-69 (Mich. 2001) (deeming 
Michigan’s private road act unconstitutional because it authorizes a taking that primarily 
benefits a private rather than a public purpose); Township of West Orange v. 769 
Assocs., 775 A.2d 657, 662-64 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001), rec’d, 800 A.2d 86 (N.J. 
2003) (finding condemnation of a road that will be used almost exclusively by residents 
is a private benefit to a private party and not the public). 
 45. Mueller, 117 Minn. at 294, 135 N.W. at 997.  The Mueller court recognized that 
the cartway statute may appear to authorize a taking of property for private use.  Id. at 
295, 135 N.W. at 997.  Although case law existed to validate such a view, the court found 
that the weight of existing authority supported the view that the only difference between a 
private and public road was “one of degree.”  Id.  The court supported its constitutional 
holding with case law of other jurisdictions, including Virginia, Oregon, Massachusetts, 
7
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requirement by recognizing that although the petitioner most directly 
benefits, the cartway is public in nature because anyone may lawfully use 
the road.46  Under Minnesota jurisprudence, a cartway is characterized as 
public or private based on “the extent of the right to use it” not “the 
extent to which that right is exercised.”47 
C.  An Alternative to Cartway Condemnation 
The cartway is a legislative creation aimed to ensure public land 
access, use, and productivity.48  Minnesota’s cartway statute allows 
private citizens to use the state’s power of eminent domain, thereby 
requiring petitioners to compensate adjacent landowners for all resultant 
property damage.49  Minnesota’s common law affords landlocked 
landowners a more stringent, less costly alternative: an implied 
easement.50  The doctrines of common law easements and statutory 
cartways utilize overlapping terminology and can create a confusing and 
non-uniform body of law surrounding landlocked property.51  Cartway 
statutes are typically enacted to enhance and expand a landowner’s 
opportunity under the common law.52  Although these are two distinct 
bodies of law,53 an understanding of the common law forms an essential 
basis for analyzing cartway statutes. 
 
and California.  Id. at 295, 135 N.W. at 998. 
 46. Id. at 295, 135 N.W. at 997-98. 
 47. Id. at 296, 135 N.W. at 998 (quoting Justice Hunt in Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. 
Mont. Union Ry. Co., 41 P. 232, 238 (Mont. 1895)). 
 48. SACKMAN, supra note 37, at § 7.07[4][i]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 51. “Few things are as certain as death, taxes, and the legal entanglement that 
follows a sale of landlocked real estate.”  Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 681 P.2d 1010, 
1013 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). 
 52. Minnesota’s cartway statute was “enacted to expand the narrow set of 
circumstances under which a party could, at common law, seek a way of necessity.”  
Ullrich v. Newburg Township Bd., No. C1-02-565, 2002 WL 31553853, at *4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Nov. 19, 2002). 
 53. See In re Daniel for the Establishment of a Cartway, 644 N.W.2d 495, 498 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2003) [hereinafter Daniel I] 
(recognizing in dicta that although they may be similar, the common law easement by 
necessity is not dispositive of statutory cartway issues). 
8
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1.  The Traditional Implied Easement54 
The easement is a common law creation, based on the theory that 
land conveyances inherently include all that is necessary for the 
beneficial use and enjoyment of the land.55  Its doctrinal roots are 
traceable as far back as the thirteenth century.56  The doctrine was 
founded upon two theoretical justifications: (1) a public policy favoring 
land utilization and (2) effecting the intent of private parties.57  Society 
does not desire property rendered unproductive for lack of access.58  
Consequently, a presumption naturally arises out of conveyances that 
parties intend land to be accessible and available for full use.59  An 
easement can typically be implied based on two distinct theories: a 
continued prior use60 or necessity.61  It is primarily the latter, however, 
that has always been submerged in controversy. 
An implied easement of necessity traditionally requires four 
elements: (1) a unified title of both parcels of land prior to severance, (2) 
subsequent severance of title, (3) a necessity that existed at the time of 
the severance, and (4) that the necessity has continued to persist.62  It is 
the degree of necessity that has rendered courts divided throughout the 
years.63  While the majority of courts require only a showing of 
reasonable necessity, several jurisdictions require a showing of strict or 
absolute necessity.64  Strict necessity means that whenever an alternative 
means of access exists, even though substantially more difficult or 
 
 54. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 1 (2002) (defining 
an easement as a right or privilege of an owner of one parcel of land to use a second 
parcel of land belonging to another). 
 55. Id. at § 23. 
 56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.15, cmt. a (2000).  A maxim 
from the time of Edward I (1239-1307) recognized that grants must include all that 
without which, the grant could not be or exist.  Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  Under this theory, necessity is based on the existence and extent of land use 
contemplated by the parties at the time of severance.  HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL 
JONES, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY, § 794 (3d ed. 2002). 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.12 (2000). 
 61. See id. at § 2.15. 
 62. Hunter C. Carroll, Property-Easements by Necessity: What Level of Necessity Is 
Required?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 475, 475 (1995). 
 63. Id. at 476. 
 64. Id. at 477-78 (giving examples of jurisdictions that follow doctrines of 
reasonable and strict necessity, respectively, as well as those that have enacted statutory 
easements of necessity). 
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expensive, an easement will be denied.65 Both views find support in 
public policy.66  While a requirement of reasonableness promotes land 
utilization, a requirement of strictness safeguards landowners from those 
who seek to unlawfully gain entrance and use of their property.67 
Regardless of the degree required, however, the mere inconvenience of 
existent access will rarely suffice.68 
2.  Minnesota’s Unique Creation 
Minnesota’s common law easement has treaded in murky waters 
since it was first recognized in 1934 (years after the cartway statute had 
been established).69  In Romanchuk v. Plotkin,70  the Minnesota Supreme 
Court identified three essential characteristics in the creation of an 
implied easement where unity of ownership is severed: (1) separation of 
title, (2) a continued and apparent use intended to be permanent in 
nature, and (3) that the use is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the 
land.71  Failing to clearly distinguish between easements by necessity 
and prior use by requiring elements of each,72 Minnesota courts have 
created an implied easement that is susceptible to continual muddied 
analysis.73 
Although this may at first appear to be an abnormally difficult 
standard to meet, the Romanchuk court went on to indicate flexibility by 
stating that not all three elements are necessary.74  The presence or 
 
 65. See id. at 477. 
 66. See id. at 476-77. 
 67. See id. 
 68. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 42 (2002). 
 69. See supra Part II.A. 
 70. 215 Minn. 156, 9 N.W.2d 421 (1943) (establishing Minnesota’s recognition of 
easements by necessity). 
 71. Id. at 160-61, 9 N.W.2d at 424. 
 72. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has recognized its use of “easements by 
implication” and “easements by necessity” interchangeably.  Bode v. Bode, 494 N.W.2d 
301, 304 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 73. Although the Bode court attempted to distinguish easements by necessity, 
relying on Powell’s The Law of Real Property, the court subsequently limited the 
distinction to parties to the severing transaction.  Id. at 303-04 n.1 (citing 3 Richard R. 
Powell, The Law of Real Property § 407 (1992)); Lake George Park, L.L.C. v. IBM Mid-
Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 576 N.W.2d 463, 466 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).  
This limitation, however, did not clarify the doctrinal confusion existing in Minnesota’s 
implied easement by necessity.  Minnesota courts continue to engage in confusing 
analysis of both prior use and necessity.  See, e.g., id. at 465 (applying the Romanchuk 
and Olson decisions).  While prior use is merely an indicia of intent, necessity is required.  
Id. 
 74. Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 164, 9 N.W.2d at 426. 
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absence of a characteristic is not to be deemed conclusive.75  The 
necessity requirement, however, must always be met.76  In Olson v. 
Mullen, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed its creative and 
discretional approach to implying easements and indicated a number of 
non-exhaustive factors to be taken into consideration.77 
In Romanchuk, Minnesota aligned itself with the majority of 
jurisdictions that require the use to be only that which is “reasonably 
necessary or convenient to the beneficial enjoyment of the property.”78  
Although convenience alone is not sufficient, difficulty and expense are 
factors to be considered in identifying a use that is “reasonable.”79  
Minnesota case law has explicitly repudiated any idea of indispensable 
use or absolute necessity.80 
III. THE DANIEL DECISION 
A.  Facts 
Donald Schoch (“Schoch”) owns lakeshore property on Lake 
Vermillion, Minnesota.81  His property has been in the Schoch family for 
more than eighty-five years.82  In 1995, Thomas Daniel (“Daniel”) 
purchased a parcel of lakefront property adjacent to Schoch’s family 
 
 75. Id.  The court viewed any rules regarding implied easements as mere rules of 
construction, useful only to aid in ascertaining the intent of the parties and the scope of 
the conveyance.  Id. at 164-65, 9 N.W.2d at 426.  The supreme court therefore left open 
“the scope and effect of the characteristics mentioned in the process of construction.”  Id. 
at 165, 9 N.W.2d at 426. 
 76. Olson v. Mullen, 244 Minn. 31, 40, 68 N.W.2d 640, 647 (1955).  The necessity 
must also have existed at the time of the severance.  Id. at 41, 68 N.W.2d at 647. 
 77. See id. at 40, 68 N.W.2d at 647.  The court used the approach of the 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, § 476 (1944).  Id. 
 78. Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 163, 9 N.W.2d at 425-26 (recognizing an authority 
split on the requisite “necessity” and adopting the majority view of “reasonable”).  For a 
historic look at the origins of the “necessity” debate, see Tooth v. Bryce, 25 A. 182 (N.J. 
Ch. 1892). 
 79. Clark v. Galaxy Apartments, 427 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(finding a lack of reasonable necessity where no “geographical constraints” existed and 
no evidence indicated that construction of a driveway would be either “difficult or 
expensive”). 
 80. See Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 163-64, 9 N.W.2d at 426 (“necessary” does not 
equate with indispensable and is not an “absolute” necessity). 
 81. Appellant’s Brief at 2, Schoch v. St. Louis County, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 
2002) (No. CX-01-1820). 
 82. Id. at 2-3. 
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property.83  Daniel was aware at purchase that the property’s only access 
was via Lake Vermillion and no road access existed.84  Daniel apparently 
utilized Lake Vermillion to access his property without complaint for 
four years.85  It was not until 1999, when a severe windstorm caused 
significant tree damage to Daniel’s property, that Daniel explored 
potential possibilities to obtain road access.86 
Schoch’s property had suffered similar tree damage, and Schoch 
had constructed a road on his own property in order to access the downed 
trees and debris.87  When Daniel contacted Schoch to discuss extending 
the road to Daniel’s property to allow similar tree removal, Schoch 
refused.88  Daniel then petitioned the St. Louis County Board of 
Commissioners to grant a cartway across Schoch’s land.89  The board 
granted Daniel the cartway, pursuant to Minnesota’s cartway statute, 
finding he did not have access to his property except over the land of 
others.90  The board ordered 3.90 acres of Schoch’s property to be taken 
for purposes of the cartway and calculated Schoch’s damages to be 
$18,022.91 
B.  Procedural History 
Schoch appealed the board’s decision to the district court.92  The 
 
 83. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544. 
 84. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3 (citing the Tr. of Summ. J. Proceedings at 
11).  The property’s purchase price likely reflected limited access.  Id. (citing the Tr. of 
Summ. J. at 5). 
 85. See Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  Daniel petitioned the board pursuant to the Minnesota cartway statute.  See 
MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subd. 2(a) (2002). 
 90. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544.  The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR), however, opposed the cartway on the basis that it would have crossed wetlands.  
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3-4.  The Minnesota DNR offered Daniel the use of 
its winter logging roads in order to facilitate removal of the blow-down timber.  Id. at 4.  
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court had already established that permissive access 
does not constitute access within the meaning of the cartway statute.  See Kroyer v. Bd. 
of Supervisors, 202 Minn. 41, 43, 277 N.W. 234, 235 (1938) (holding that where access 
to a public road is only permissive in nature, access does not exist for cartway purposes 
due to a lack of a permanent, legal right of use). 
 91. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at app. 3 (board’s Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions, and Order).  Under Minnesota’s cartway statute, damages would have been 
paid by Daniel.  See  MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subd. 2(c) (2002). 
 92. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at app. 5 (District Court’s Order and 
Judgment). 
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Minnesota district court granted summary judgment to St. Louis County, 
affirming the board’s decision.93  Unable to find any case law or statute 
indicative of legislative intent that lake access warrants denial of a 
cartway petition, the district court held that the board did not abuse its 
legislative discretion in granting the petition.94 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment.95 The parties did not dispute that Daniel could 
access his property over Lake Vermillion.96  The only issue to be 
resolved was the interpretation of the word “access” as used in the 
cartway statute.97  To interpret the ambiguous term “access,” the 
appellate court considered the mischief to be remedied by the cartway 
statute, as well as its desired objective.98  The court also considered the 
consequences of particular interpretations in order to avoid attaining an 
unreasonable result.99  Recognizing that lake access may likely satisfy 
legislative intent in light of the mischief to be remedied and the statutory 
objective, the appellate court ruled out lake access as valid on the basis 
that not allowing road access would be unreasonable.100  The court 
reasoned that lake access is inadequate due to the inherent seasonality of 
lakes and the inevitable “vicissitudes of the Minnesota climate.”101 
 
 93. Id. at app. 6. 
 94. Id. at app. 7-10 (District Court’s Memorandum Opinion). 
 95. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d 495.  The appellate court noted that no controlling 
authority existed and that the ambiguous term “access” was to be construed pursuant to 
Minnesota Statutes section 645.16 (2000).  Id. at 497. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  Application of a statute to undisputed facts is purely a question of law.  Id.  
The court, therefore, disregarded Schoch’s reliance on the Roemer decision.  Id. at 498.  
The Roemer decision contemplated access where the owner already had a means of 
ingress and egress where an easement by necessity exists.  Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors, 
283 Minn. 288, 291, 167 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1969).  However, Roemer was held not to 
control due to the court’s interpretation that water access did not constitute access, and 
thus a valid alternative did not exist for Daniel.  Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 498. 
 98. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 497. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id.  The seasonality of Minnesota’s waterways, however, has long been 
incorporated into commercial usage.  See WATER RES. COORDINATING COMM., MINN. 
STATE PLANNING AGENCY, MINN. WATER AND RELATED LAND RES., FIRST ASSESSMENT, 
(1970) [hereinafter WATER LAND RESOURCES] (analyzing the past and predicting the 
future of the commercial uses of Minnesota’s waterway navigation).  The court’s 
reasoning is in line with other courts that have deemed that navigable water is not 
acceptable as access where it freezes and thus can not be navigated for several months of 
the year.  See, e.g., Rodal v. Crawford, 261 N.W. 260, 263 (Mich. 1935) (stating in dicta 
that water access that is otherwise navigable but frozen for several months a year cannot 
constitute valid access). 
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Though not controlling, the appellate court relied heavily on the 
decision in State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood to support its 
interpretation of the cartway statute.102  In Rose, the petitioner was 
entitled to a cartway where two of petitioner’s three lots were not 
accessible via a public road due to a muddy lake.103  It was impracticable 
to build a road to cross the lake and join the lots.104  The court likened 
the Rose scenario to Daniel’s debacle, in that the building of a road 
across the lake was impracticable, thus entitling Daniel to a cartway.105  
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review.106 
C.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s 
assertion that the sole issue was the correct statutory interpretation of the 
term “access” as used in the cartway statute.107  Statutory interpretation 
must be aimed at effecting the intent of the legislature.108  In conclusory 
fashion, the court deemed any interpretation rendering water access as 
invalid would be improper in light of legislative intent.109  The court 
reasoned that the “no access” language first appeared in the cartway 
statute in 1913, at which time travel over navigable waterways was not 
only common, but often the best mode of transportation.110 
St. Louis County argued that only land access was contemplated by 
the legislature due to the statute being within a town road statute.111  
 
 102. State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 220 Minn. 508, 20 N.W.2d 345 
(1945). 
 103. Id. at 513-14, 20 N.W.2d at 347-48. 
 104. Id. at 513-14, 20 N.W.2d at 348. 
 105. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 498. 
 106. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 545. 
 107. Id.  Application of statutory language to undisputed facts is a conclusion of law, 
reviewable de novo on appeal.  Id. 
 108. Id.  In ascertaining legislative intent, a court may consider: 
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the circumstances under which 
it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to be attained, 
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar 
subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the 
contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) legislative and administrative 
interpretations of the statute. 
MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002). 
 109. Daniel II, 656 N.W. 2d at 545. 
 110. Id.  The court further recognized that numerous other properties on Lake 
Vermillion had been accessed solely by water for more than a century.  Id. at 546. 
 111. Id. 
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However, the supreme court promptly refuted any such argument.112  
The location of the statute as part of a “roads” statute was deemed to be 
non-determinative of whether or not “access” was intended to include 
both land and water access.113  The court then went on to find all 
Minnesota case law regarding cartways as inapposite on the interpretive 
issue.114 
The appellate court’s reliance on the Rose decision was deemed 
erroneous.115  The supreme court found the issue involved in Rose to be 
distinctly different.  In Rose, the issue of whether property could be 
accessed by lake was never considered.116  The Rose decision was 
limited to whether the nature of the lake on plaintiff’s property prevented 
land-based travel across the property to a section that did have access to 
a public road.117  The board’s finding that Daniel had no access to his 
property was irreconcilable with the supreme court’s interpretation of the 
statute.118  The court of appeals was thus reversed and the case remanded 
to the district court to enter judgment in favor of Schoch.119  The Daniel 
decision requires that ingress and egress via navigable waters must be 
taken into consideration when determining cartway eligibility.120 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DANIEL DECISION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court rightfully limited the scope of its 
decision to ascertaining legislative intent.121  Although its ascertainment 
of that intent was of a conclusory nature, it is supported by history.122  It 
is interesting, however, that the Daniel decision introduces Minnesota to 
overtones of “strict” access requirements, clearly contradicting the 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  The county had premised its reasoning that lake access is inconsistent with 
the “overall intention of the statute.”  Id. at 545.  Therefore, the court could have more 
directly refuted the county’s argument on the basis that the “letter of the law shall not be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”  MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002). 
 114. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546. See also Christopherson v. Fillmore Township, 
583 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no Minnesota authority that defined 
“access” for purposes of statutory construction). 
 115. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546. 
 116. See Rose, 220 Minn. 508, 20 N.W.2d 345. 
 117. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  There was no need for further factual findings because it was never disputed 
that Daniel had access to his property using Lake Vermillion.  Id. 
 120. Id. at 545. 
 121. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 122. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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common law doctrine of “reasonableness” that facilitates land access.123 
A.  Correct Decision . . . Correct Interpretation 
1.  A Correct Decision 
Establishment of a statutory cartway by a town board is a quasi-
legislative action124 and is therefore subject only to narrow judicial 
review.125  Accordingly, Minnesota courts afford great deference to 
board determinations of cartway petitions.126  A town or county board’s 
decision may be reversed only if it is clearly against the evidence, based 
on an erroneous theory of law, or if the board acts arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or contrary to public interest.127  The Daniel court’s 
reversal of the St. Louis County Board’s decision is justified on the basis 
that the board’s misinterpretation of “access” resulted in an application 
of an erroneous theory of law.128 
Courts cannot disregard specific statutory language in order to attain 
a statute’s alleged overall “spirit.”129  Therefore, the supreme court 
correctly limited its interpretation analysis to the precise “no access” 
language in dispute.130  The court rightfully looked to the historical 
 
 123. See supra Part II.B. 
 124. Horton v. Township of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 125. Id. at 595 (“When judicially reviewing a legislative determination, the scope of 
review must necessarily be narrow” (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Vill. of New Hope, 300 
Minn. 326, 333, 220 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1974)).  See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 
32 (1954) (“The role of the judiciary in determining whether th[e] power [of eminent 
domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”).  The level 
of review afforded legislative decisions is often referred to as “rational basis.”  See Haw. 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (stating that a taking has never violated 
the public use requirement where it was “rationally related to a conceivable public 
purpose”) (emphasis added). 
 126. Courts will even affirm when they would have reached a different conclusion 
themselves.  Horton, 624 N.W.2d at 595. 
 127. Id..  See also Lafayette Land Co. v. Vill. of Tonka Bay, 305 Minn. 461, 463, 
234 N.W.2d 804, 805 (1975) (recognizing an established rule that decisions to open 
streets are vested solely in the legislative discretion of municipalities); Lieser v. Town of 
St. Martin, 255 Minn. 153, 158, 96 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1959) (recognizing town boards act in a 
legislative capacity when considering town road petitions); Rask v. Town Bd. of 
Hendrum, 173 Minn. 572, 574, 218 N.W. 115, 116 (1928) (indicating the question of 
whether a cartway should be established is “one of policy, legislative in its nature”) 
(citation omitted). 
 128. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 546. 
 129. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002) (stating that the “letter of the law shall not be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit”). 
 130. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 545-46. 
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context underlying the statute’s 1913 amendment to ascertain legislative 
intent.131  Daniel’s particularly unfortunate situation was appropriately 
not determinative on the court’s decision; statutory interpretation is to 
prioritize public interest over the interest of private citizens.132 
The court appropriately refrained from altering the cartway statute 
and limited itself to statutory interpretation.133  Although lake access 
may appear inadequate and inconvenient in light of today’s modern 
modes of transportation, the court’s holding was the only proper 
disposition of the case.  Statutory change must originate in the legislature 
itself.134  In order to accommodate the transportation needs of today’s 
society, the Minnesota legislature has the sole capacity to either amend 
the cartway statute or statutorily define “access” in order to allow 
cartways to be condemned where land is water accessible.135 
2.  A Correct Interpretation 
The Minnesota Supreme Court had minimal documentation to assist 
in ascertaining the intent of Minnesota’s 38th legislature (1913).  What is 
documented is that the disputed “access” language was referred to the 
Committee on Roads and Bridges by the House of Representatives.136  
However, no committee reports are available today.  Although multiple 
amendments to the bill were considered prior to passage, none was in 
reference to the disputed “access” language.137  A brief glance at 
 
 131. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(b) (2002). 
 132. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(5) (2002) (stating a presumption in favor of the 
public interest over private interest).  However, promoting lake access cannot entirely be 
said to be against the interest of the Minnesota public.  Legislative assessments have 
indicated a strong Minnesota public benefit that arises out of not only commercial 
navigation but also recreational uses of navigable waterways.  WATER LAND RESOURCES, 
supra note 101, at 280.  Developing water resources for navigation greatly contributes to 
Minnesota’s economic development and social well-being.  Id.  For many Minnesotans 
the motorboat has become a necessity; motor-boating, waterskiing, and canoeing have all 
boomed during the last half-century.  LASS, supra note 1, at 27. 
 133. “The people may change the law of the United States but the Court cannot do 
so.  The Court can only interpret the law.”  United States. v. Perko, 133 F. Supp. 564, 570 
(D. Minn. 1955). 
 134. “If there is to be a change in the statute, it must come from the legislature, for 
the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently 
overlooks.”  Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) 
(citations omitted). 
 135. See id. 
 136. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF MINNESOTA, 371 (1913). 
 137. See id. at 562-71 and JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF 
MINNESOTA, 1063-66, 1111, 1135-42 (1913). 
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Minnesota history compensates the lack of legislative history and clearly 
supports the supreme court’s interpretation of the elusive term “access.” 
Minnesota’s lakes are a current source of pride for both rural and 
urban residents.138  This pride is not a recent phenomenon; it is deeply 
entrenched throughout Minnesota’s history.139  The state’s abundant 
water highways have decisively influenced Minnesota’s diplomatic and 
legal architecture.140  The Legislative Manual of 1913 boasted an 
existent pride in Minnesota’s water resources that first resounded when 
the territory was named after the “Minisota” river.141  The manual 
proudly declared that “few states are so well watered as Minnesota” and 
that Minnesota’s lakes were more varied and numerous than any other 
state’s.142  Waterway pride, however, never foreclosed any opportunities 
for the state to keep up with the nation’s transportation developments. 
An analysis of the early development in transportation, both in 
Minnesota and on the national level, is necessary to comprehend the 
legislature’s use of the word “access” in 1913.  On the national level, the 
first American gasoline-powered automobile was designed in 1893.143  
By 1900 there were only approximately 8000 automobiles throughout the 
United States, primarily possessed by the rich.144  The industry was 
revolutionized, however, in 1903 when Henry Ford established the Ford 
Motor Co. of Detroit, Michigan.145  Five years later, Ford introduced the 
American public to the inexpensive Model T.146  Yet it wasn’t until 1913 
that Ford’s foresight and pragmatic approach resulted in the first 
automobile assembly line.147  The efficiency of the assembly line, 
 
 138. TESTER, supra note 8, at 197.  Minnesotans naturally speak of the state’s 
thousands of lakes when asked about its characteristic geographic features.  BLEGEN, 
supra note 9, at 12-13. 
 139. Minnesota’s geographic factors have always been interwoven with its human 
story.  BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 4. 
 140. Id. at 7.  Transportation at statehood (in the 1850s) underwent a revolution; 
innovations included expanding the use of canals, steamboats, roads, and railroads.  Id. at 
180. 
 141. SCHMAHL, supra note 18, at 198. 
 142. Id. at 199.  This statement holds true today.  Minnesota measures 84,068 square 
miles, with water constituting 4,059 of those miles.  BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 6.  This is 
greater than any other state.  Id. 
 143. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HERITAGE: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 291 
(Michael Sagalyn, ed., Penguin Putnam, Inc. 1998).  Charles and Frank Duryea designed 
the vehicle in Springfield, Massachusetts.  Id. 
 144. ALLEN WEINSTEIN & DAVID RUBEL, THE STORY OF AMERICA: FREEDOM AND 
CRISIS FROM SETTLEMENT TO SUPERPOWER 469 (DK Publishing, Inc. 2002). 
 145. Id. 
 146. BRINKLEY, supra note 143, at 387.  In 1908, the Model T sold for $845.  Id. 
 147. WEINSTEIN & RUBEL, supra note 144, at 469. 
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coupled with Ford’s allowance of installment plans, fueled the industry’s 
growth.148  The subsequent explosion in automobile ownership 
influenced Americans both economically and socially.149 
As splendid as its waterways were, Minnesotans were early to 
identify the paramount need for good roads.150  Even as a territory, 
strong public policy recognized land access as a priority in territorial 
expansion.151  The territorial legislature was thus quick to authorize and 
develop a needed network of roads, quickly trodden upon by buggies, 
carriages, and stagecoaches.152  In Minnesota, 1913 was a year engulfed 
in transportation transitions.153  Minnesotans were increasingly 
recognizing and appreciating the value of reliable land-based 
transportation.154 
Minnesotans, however, were only first introduced to the automobile 
revolution in the late 1890s.155  In 1898, Minnesota’s constitution was 
amended to create a highway commission and state tax that were 
designed to aid road development.156  Yet by 1902, only twelve cars 
could be found in the state.157  Fascination with the industry prompted its 
rapid growth; by 1909, 7000 automobiles and 4000 motorcycles had 
been licensed in the state.158  Such exponential growth was influential in 
 
 148. Id. at 470.  Within three years of the assembly line’s introduction, Ford was able 
to lower the Model T’s price to $360 and increase sales from 10,607 to 730,041 vehicles 
per year.  Id. 
 149. Id.  By 1926, Ford was producing a Model T every ten seconds.  BRINKLEY, 
supra note 143, at 387. 
 150. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 192. 
 151. Id. Minnesotans began to question “[h]ow public lands could be sold ‘if the 
immigrant[s] cannot reach them?’ ”  Id. 
 152. Id. at 192-93. 
 153. The automobile industry was not the only source of transition.  The lumber 
industry, dependent on the state’s abundant navigable rivers, reached its high point in 
1900, when Minnesota produced more than 2 billion board feet and was ranked third 
nationally for lumber production.  LASS, supra note 1, at 180.  However, Minnesota’s 
lumber production declined gradually by 1914, it yielded only half of what it had in 1905.  
BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 329.  Carl Wickman, an enterprising business pioneer, left his 
job in 1913 to buy the Hupmobile, a seven-passenger vehicle, to transport miners.  
STEPHEN GEORGE, ENTERPRISING MINNESOTANS: 150 YEARS OF BUSINESS PIONEERS 90 
(University of Minnesota Press 2003).  With gasoline selling for 4 cents a gallon, he 
charged 15 cents for a one-way trip and became the founder of Minnesota’s bus industry.  
Id. 
 154. In 1913 Minnesota inaugurated “Good Roads Day” to be the third Tuesday of 
every June.  BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 465. 
 155. Id. at 463. 
 156. Id. at 464.  However, the commission was not set into motion until 1905.  Id. 
 157. Id. at 463. The speed limit in 1902 was ten miles per hour. Id. at 463-64. 
 158. Id. at 464.  Minnesota’s transportation developments mirrored those of the 
19
Kanski: Property Law—Minnesota’s Lake Shore Property Owners Without Road
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
14 KANSKI - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:50 PM 
744 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
 
pressuring the state for the development of a sound road system.159 
Regardless of its rapid growth, clearly in 1913 the phenomenon of 
vehicular transportation had not yet trumped the state’s dependence on 
navigable waters.160  Progress in the road-building industry dwindled 
through World War I.161  Minnesota’s licensing act was not passed until 
1908;162 the highway department was first authorized only in 1917.163  
From a historical point of view, the common usage of “access” in 1913 
would clearly not have excluded water access.164 
B.  Statutory Dissension 
Discord abounds throughout the nation as states grant statutory 
cartways based on varying degrees of necessity.  The majority of states 
have deemed cartways necessary whenever practicable or reasonable 
under the circumstances.165  Access must be of a level that allows 
effective use of the land.166  This flows from the idea that access need 
not be of an absolute or indispensable character to warrant 
recognition.167  Instead, necessity is inherently interwoven with the 
 
nation.  Four thousand cars, produced by a dozen companies, could be found throughout 
the United States in 1900.  Id. at 463. Within ten years, production skyrocketed to 
181,000 cars being produced by sixty-nine companies.  Id. 
 159. See id. at 464 (stating cars contributed to the pressures in the state for good 
roads but interest in improving rough roads was present before the introduction of the 
automobile). 
 160. In the early 1900s the automobile was considered to be nothing more than a 
“curiosity,” “a contrivance for the rich,” and a “noisy phenomenon that nobody quite 
knew how to control.”  Id. 
 161. Id. at 465. 
 162. Id. at 464. 
 163. Id. at 465. 
 164. See MINN. STAT. § 645.08, subd. 1 (2002) (requiring words to be construed to 
their common and approved usage). 
 165. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1202 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-66-401 
(Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-102 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-40 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 7-701 
(Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-117 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-7-201 (2002) 
amended by 2003 Miss. Laws 535; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-68 (2002); 36 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2731 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 8.24.010 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 24-9-
101 (Michie 2002) amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 9.  To add to the confusion, 
Missouri specifies “strict necessity” in the statute, but has interpreted “strict” as meaning 
the absence of a “reasonable and practical” way.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2002); 
Anderson v. Mantel, 49 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting § 228.342). 
 166. Sorenson v. Czinger, 852 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (citation 
omitted). 
 167. See City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 399 P.2d 330, 335 (Wash. 1965) (interpreting 
the necessity language of Washington’s cartway statute). 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/14
14 KANSKI - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:50 PM 
2003] LAKE ACCESS AND THE CREATION OF CARTWAYS 745 
 
concept of public use and embraces the public’s right to access.168  This 
“reasonable” viewpoint facilitates the very purpose of cartway legislation 
by avoiding the rendering of land useless169 and furthering the public 
policy behind land accessibility.170  A landowner should be entitled to 
the full enjoyment of his property, especially if the enjoyment would 
make useful and valuable that which otherwise would be useless or 
valueless.171 
However, whenever a cartway is laid under the pretext of a 
landowner’s right of access, it is done in derogation of the adjoining 
landowner’s rights.172  Recognition of this injustice may explain why an 
extreme minority of courts have adopted a very narrow view on when 
cartways are truly “necessary.”173  It is within this category, however, 
that the Daniel decision mandates future interpretations of the cartway 
statute by Minnesota courts.  The courts have previously afforded great 
deference to board determinations regarding cartway petitions.174  This 
deference has been illustrated by Minnesota courts upholding board 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Iowa 2000) (citing In re Luloff, 
512 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing it is socially desirable to make 
landlocked property useable)). 
 170. Moore v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 95 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ind. 1950). 
 171. See Miss. Power Co. v. Fairchild, 791 So. 2d 262, 266 (Miss. Ct. App. (2001) 
(citing Warwick v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 246 So. 2d 525, 528 (Miss. 
1971) (recognizing that without access a portion of land would be rendered of little use or 
value)). 
 172. This has resulted in several courts strictly construing cartway statutes in order 
prevent undue injustice to the adjoining landowners.  See, e.g., Brown v. Glass, 50 S.E.2d 
912, 912-13 (N.C. 1948) (holding that the statutory requirements are strict conditions 
precedent to the laying of a statutory cartway); Olivo v. Rasmussen, 738 P.2d 333, 335 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that decisions between land condemnation and 
landlocked property boils down to choosing the “lesser of the two evils”). 
 173. Bowles v. Chapman, 175 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tenn. 1943) (quoting 17 AM. JUR. 
Easements § 50) (requiring a showing of absolute necessity, and not mere inconvenience, 
in applying the common law doctrine of easement of necessity).  Some statutes have 
alleviated the subjective nature of this inquiry by specifying in the statute prerequisites of 
specific land use to allow a cartway.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2003) (right 
exists for land being used as a dwelling, agricultural, timber, or stock raising purpose); 
IDAHO CODE § 7-701 (Michie 2003) (eminent domain authorized to lay byroads leading 
from highway to a residence or farm); IND. CODE § 32-23-3-1 (2003) (applying only when 
land is isolated due to a stream straightening, ditch construction, or erection of a dam); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3022 (West 2003) (requiring land must be cultivated in 
order to be entitled to a “public easement”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 247.211 (2003) 
(establishing roads to residences or lake resort homes where lands have been platted and 
duly recorded); N.Y. REAL PROP. § 335(a) (McKinney 2002) (applying to lots on 
subdivision maps filed in the county clerk’s office). 
 174. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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decisions that require both aspects of “strict” access necessity175 as well 
as board decisions requiring only access that is “reasonable or 
practical.”176 
Daniel’s physical access to his property was never disputed.177  At 
dispute was whether the existent lake access constituted a viable means 
of access under the cartway statute.178  Under the circumstances, 
however, Daniel’s predicament rendered physical lake access 
inconvenient in light of his need to remove large amounts of fallen 
timber.  Not allowing Daniel road access to his property entitles Daniel 
only to a physical means of access that is neither reasonable nor 
practicable.  The supreme court’s decision has thus removed a degree of 
deference formerly afforded board determinations.  Future board 
decisions will necessarily replace circumstantial consideration with a 
mandated view that water access is a viable and appropriate means of 
property access, thereby precluding a cartway. 
C.  Prospective Amendment 
The Minnesota legislature could resolve future land “access” 
disputes arising under the cartway statute by following the lead of 
several other states.  First, several states’ cartway statutes have 
specifically resolved the Daniel issue by utilizing language that specifies 
a cartway is justified when property is completely surrounded by either 
 
 175. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has previously affirmed town board decisions 
denying cartway petitions notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the access situation 
presented.  See Horton v. Township of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (deeming access via horse, snowmobile, and all-terrain vehicles sufficient); In re 
the Petition of Wood for the Establishment of a Township Cartway, No. CX-98-852, 
1996 WL 70101, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1996) (requiring a property owner to 
cross a stream with farm equipment or construct a bridge to access forty acres of property 
without road access).  Contra Harris v. Gray, 188 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945) 
(finding it was not reasonable or practicable to expect a property owner to cross a river 
with farming machinery in order to access property). 
 176. Ullrich v. Newburg Township Bd., No. C1-02-565, 2003 WL 31553853, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002) (finding that where a river was deemed impassable due 
to its high banks and fast-flowing water, no reasonable access existed for purposes of 
laying a cartway).  This stance is supported by other jurisdictions.  Even though access to 
the property is not absolutely cut off, it fails to afford the landowner beneficial enjoyment 
of his property.  Miss. Power Co. v. Fairchild, 791 So. 2d 262, 266 (holding that where 
bridge construction is cost prohibitive it renders access unreasonable and supporting its 
stance with Mississippi and Connecticut case law).  See also Alpaugh v. Moore, 568 
So. 2d 291, 295 (Miss. 1990) (recognizing the inherent unreasonableness in requiring 
property owners to build bridges in order to access their land). 
 177. Daniel II, 656 N.W.2d at 544. 
 178. Id. at 544-45. 
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the property of another or water.179  These statutes inherently deem water 
access, on its own, to be insufficient.180 
A further amendment would be to remove any linguistic ambiguity 
by specifying whether the statute ensures access to property or access to 
a road.  Although not addressed by the supreme court, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals interpreted the statute by looking at the apparent 
mischief it was to remedy.181  In so doing, it stated that the mischief was 
the situation where a landowner “has no way to reach a public road from 
his property.”182  The statute, however, reads: “the owner of a tract of 
land . . . who has no access thereto except over the land of others.”183  
This linguistic ambiguity, whether the statute specifically regards access 
to a public road or access to property, only creates additional interpretive 
problems that could be easily clarified by more precise language.184  
Many cartway statutes have resolved any such ambiguity by specifying 
“access to a road” and not “access to property.”185  Language 
guaranteeing road access, instead of property access, would also best 
mirror the original cartway statute of the Minnesota Territory.186 
Daniel knowingly purchased lakeshore property with limited 
access.187  Minnesota’s cartway statute, however, does not condition the 
granting of cartways on whether the petitioner created the need for 
access.188  Some states, however, could have resolved the Daniel issue 
solely on the basis that Daniel created his own predicament by 
 
 179. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-66-401 (Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
68.117; NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-17-13 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 80.13 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-26-815 (Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 161). 
 180. See supra note 179.  However, the Arkansas statute reads slightly differently in 
that it allows access to navigable watercourses, where desired.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 
27-66-401 (Michie 2002). 
 181. Daniel I, 644 N.W.2d at 497. 
 182. Id. 
 183. MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subd.2(a) (2002). 
 184. See infra Part IV.B. 
 185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.350 
(Banks-Baldwin 2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-07-06 
(2002) (amended by 2003 N.D. Laws 223); OR. REV. STAT. § 376.155 (2002); 36 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2731 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 31-22-1 (Michie 2002); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-14-101 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 80.13 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
26-815 (Michie 2002) (amended by 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 161). 
 186. “Any person who shall be so located that his land has no connection with any 
public road, or cartway . . . may apply to the board . . . [for a cartway] to some convenient 
public road.”  REVISED MINN. STAT. ch. 11, § 13 (1851). 
 187. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3 (citing the Tr. of Summ. J. Proceedings at 
11). 
 188. See MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2002). 
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purchasing property he knew to have lake-only access.189  Statutes exist 
that specifically negate any cartway option where a landowner either 
purchases property with knowledge that no access exists or knowingly 
eliminates the access he has.190  Other state courts have similarly 
interpreted cartway statutes to render them inapplicable where a 
landowner voluntarily creates his predicament.191  Any argument that 
statutory cartway condemnation unjustly increases property values 
allowing subsequent sales yielding higher prices is negated by the 
statutory requirement that the petitioner pay for all resultant damages.192 
Few courts have specifically addressed the situation of a landowner 
attempting to remove timber from his private property over a lake.193  
However, several courts have addressed the issue of lake access for 
purposes of statutory cartways.194  Where property borders navigable 
waters, clearly access to the property exists in some form.195  As in 
Daniel, the question then becomes whether the navigable waters afford 
reasonable access within the boundaries of the statutory grant of 
authority.196 
Bodies of water have provided transportation means and prompted 
 
 189. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 81, at 3 (citing the Tr. of Summ. J. Proceedings at 
11). 
 190. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.350 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 376.155 (2002). 
 191. See Cont’l Enters., Inc. v. Cain, 387 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (stating 
that where subsequent owners purchase land without access there can be no taking as to 
the subsequent owner); Graff v. Scanlan, 673 A.2d 1028, 1033 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) 
(finding that landowners are precluded from common law easements by necessity where 
they have voluntarily created their own predicament). 
 192. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2002).  See also Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors, 283 
Minn. 288, 291-92, 167 N.W.2d 497, 500 (1969) (recognizing in dicta a fear that 
construing the statute to allow alternative road access could lead to potential abuse of 
spending public money on roads where one should privately negotiate the value and pay 
damages). 
 193. The majority of opinions that have dealt with timber removal and road access 
have been in the context of the logging industry, often denying road access where a 
navigable stream was available to float the logs.  See, e.g., Taylor v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper 
Co., 137 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 1964); State v. Superior Court, 190 P. 234 (Wash. 1920). 
 194. See, e.g., Redman v. Kidwell, 180 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) 
(holding that where property was only accessible via navigable water, the landowner was 
entitled to a cartway due to water access being impracticable); In re Hall v. Twin Caney 
Watershed Joint Dist. No. 34, 604 P.2d 63, 65 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (recognizing that in 
order to preclude property access, the bordering water must be so extensive as to deprive 
any reasonable passage over it). 
 195. Int’l Paper Realty Corp. v. Miller, 341 S.E.2d 445, 446 (Ga. 1986) (establishing 
that where property is accessible only by navigable waters a prima facie case has been 
established that there is no reasonable access for purposes of statutory construction). 
 196. Id. 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/14
14 KANSKI - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:50 PM 
2003] LAKE ACCESS AND THE CREATION OF CARTWAYS 749 
 
land development for centuries.197  However, the development of 
extensive land transportation systems has rendered means of ingress and 
egress by water less necessary and less desirable.198  In this day and age, 
navigable bodies of water are seldom considered reasonable as a sole 
means of traveling.199  Several states have taken this stance.200  Some 
courts have gone so far as to specifically interpret a cartway statute as 
being outdated in light of modern travel by motor vehicle.201 
D.  Navigable Water & Common Law “Necessity” 
Neither geography nor humankind is static; both operate as 
architects of change.202  Minnesota’s stagnant statutory constructions 
aside, implied easement jurisprudence has been gradually sculpted to 
keep apace with modern transportation.203  As previously stated, the only 
potential source of change in the cartway statute is the Minnesota 
legislature.204  However, an overview of common law trends may be 
indicative of future legislative reaction to the Daniel decision. 
The Minnesota courts have not yet considered the reasonableness of 
water access for purposes of common law implied easements.  
Regardless, the Daniel decision is difficult to square with Minnesota’s 
long-standing standard of “reasonableness.”205  Since its doctrinal 
inception, the cartway’s common law counterpart has adopted the view 
 
 197. Redman, 180 So. 2d at 684. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Int’l Paper, 341 S.E.2d at 446 (reasoning that society is better off as a whole by 
deeming water access as unreasonable access). 
 200. See, e.g., Redman, 180 So. 2d at 684 (stating that although practicable a century 
ago, today access to land by boat is unreasonable); Hancock v. Henderson, 202 A.2d 599, 
602 (Md. 1964) (acknowledging sound social policy reasons in allowing easements 
where land borders on navigable water); Cale v. Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329, 333 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) (noting a trend since the 1920s toward liberally granting 
easements despite water access); Cookston v. Box, 160 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1959) (stating in dicta that water access does not facilitate transportation to allow the 
carrying on of the “ordinary and necessary activities of life from and to the land”); see 
also E. L. Kellett, Annotation, Easements: Way by Necessity Where Property Is 
Accessible by Navigable Water, 9 A.L.R.3D 600 § 3 (1966). 
 201. See, e.g., Attaway v. Davis, 707 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ark. 1986) (recognizing that 
statutory language deeming access by water to be sufficient was adopted more than a 
century ago, in 1871, and that today access by boat would not be reasonable). 
 202. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 13. 
 203. See Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156, 1160 n.4 (Me. 1993) (acknowledging that 
the common law easement must be reexamined based on the “ascendancy of the 
automobile”). 
 204. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 205. Romanchuk v. Plotkin, 215 Minn. 156, 163, 9 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1943). 
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that an easement should be implied whenever “convenient to the 
beneficial enjoyment of the property.”206  An absolute or indispensable 
need need not be shown.207 
Although Minnesota courts have not addressed common law 
“necessity” regarding navigable water, several jurisdictions have.208  
Availability, convenience, popularity, and expense have been factors in 
the development of both transportation and the judicial decisions 
analyzing what constitutes reasonable land access.209  Clearly modes of 
transportation such as helicopters and planes truly render the present-day 
concept of “no access” to require steep conditions.210  However, courts 
have implied easements by necessity in furtherance of the public policy 
goal of full and productive land use. 
A debate regarding the requisite degree of “necessity” continues to 
persist.211  Difficulty in ascertaining a subjective degree of “necessity” is 
one of the very reasons many states have enacted cartway statutes.212  A 
1966 survey of cases identified that out of ten cases that deemed water 
access as sufficient, only two were decided after 1925.213  Interestingly, 
out of the eight cases that deemed water access insufficient, only one was 
dated prior to 1927.214  This trend in case law follows the historic boom 
of automotive transportation that occurred in the early twentieth 
century.215 
 
 206. Id.  See also supra Part II.C.2. 
 207. Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 163, 9 N.W.2d at 426. 
 208. Kellett, supra note 200, at § 1(c). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id.; see also Chandler Flyers v. Stellar Dev. Corp., 592 P.2d 387, 388 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
 211. Carroll, supra note 62, at 476-77 (surveying the existing majority view 
(reasonable necessity), minority view (strict necessity), and statutory ways of necessity).  
A minority of jurisdictions have required a showing of “strict necessity” in order to 
prevent unlawful entrance onto the land of others. Id.  In order to satisfy the “strict 
necessity” requirement, no alternative access may exist.  Id. 
 212. Id. at 477.  Some states, however, deem compliance with any available common 
law options a prerequisite to petitioning for a statutory remedy.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 27-66-401 (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-102 (2002); IND. CODE § 32-
23-3-1 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 6 (2002).  Florida, for example, has clarified any 
confusion between common law easements and statutory easements by codifying both.  
FLA. STAT. ch. 704.01(2) (2002). 
 213. Carroll, supra note 62, at 477. 
 214. Id.  The inability of water access to meet the requirements of a property’s use 
has been recognized since the 1900s.  See Feoffees v. Proprietors of Jeffrey’s Neck 
Pasture, 55 N.E. 462, 463 (Mass. 1899) (recognizing a split in jurisdictions regarding 
water access and necessity). 
 215. The modern trend that has occurred since the 1920s is specifically addressed in 
Cale v. Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972).  The Cale court 
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This apparent transition in the case law is logical in light of the 
nation’s contemporaneous development that occurred in the Roaring 
’20s.  The United States shined throughout the 1920s, skyrocketing its 
gross national product and wealth; jobs, earnings, and consumption by 
American citizens simultaneously increased at a tremendous rate.216  The 
automobile industry shared in America’s success.217  The automobile 
made the single most-important impact on the nation’s economy during 
this decisive period, employed 7.1% of the nation’s industrial workforce, 
and paid 8.7% of its wages.218  Throughout the ’20s, the automobile 
transformed America’s culture and landscape, proving itself to be a 
revolution.219 
Since 1966, the vast majority of cases addressing water access have 
similarly found water access to be unreasonable in light of current modes 
of transportation.220  Even in those jurisdictions requiring the access need 
to be “absolute,” exceptions have been found where water access is 
 
further stated no evidence existed to indicate access by boat over water would be 
reasonable or practicable.  Id. 
 216. BRINKLEY, supra note 143, at 367.  Throughout the decade, the nation’s gross 
national product increased from $74 billion to $104 billion.  Id.  The nation’s wealth 
soared from $192 billion in 1914 to $367 billion by 1929.  Id.  The significance of such 
exponential growth to Americans was, quite simply, more jobs.  Id.  American workers 
enjoyed a 26% increase in real earnings over the decade.  Id.  Such an increase 
necessarily resulted in comparable increases in consumption.  Id.  The number of homes 
with automobiles jumped from 25% to 60%.  Id. 
 217. During the 1920s, automobile sales rose from 1.9 million to 4.5 million, 
accounting for $3 billion in sales.  BRINKLEY, supra note 143, at 384-85.  In 1920, 
200,000 cars were on the road; by 1929 there were 23 million.  Id. 
 218. Id. at 385.  In 1929 it was estimated that one in nine American workers was 
employed either by the automobile industry or one directly related to it.  Id. 
 219. Id.  Social ramifications of the automobile industry included the phenomenon of 
suburbia by encouraging movement away from city centers and continual connections 
between urban and rural America.  Id.  Physically, 10,000 miles of paved highway were 
being laid down by the United States government annually.  Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Chandler Flyer, Inc. v. Stellar Dev. Corp., 592 P.2d 387, 388 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1979) (stating that as a result of the predominance of the motor vehicle, 
easements of necessity can be imposed where there is access by navigable water); 
Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Me. 1993) (recognizing need to reexamine 
“necessity” in light of modern transportation); Cale, 296 A.2d at 333 (stating the trend 
since the 1920s is towards allowing easements despite water access due to people 
“driving” and not “rowing” to work); Parker v. Putney, 492 S.E.2d 159, 161-62 (Va. 
1997) (recognizing the modern view that necessity can exist where land borders a 
waterway because the waterway is not suitable to meet the reasonable use requirements 
of the property).  Cf. McQuinn v. Tantalo 339 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) 
(holding that when land is accessible by water the requirement of strict necessity is not 
met). 
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deemed unreasonable.221  More and more, courts have recognized that 
travel for even short distances is most always by motor vehicle.222  
Today, motor vehicles are the predominant form of transportation.223  
There are therefore sound policy reasons for allowing cartways when 
water access is simply unsuitable to meet the requirements of the 
reasonable uses of property.224 
V. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR A CHANGE 
Today, Minnesota is not often thought of as it was in its original 
natural abundance.225  The state’s meandering rivers and abundant lakes 
have faded in importance in the wakes of the plethora of vehicles 
traversing the state.226  From a historical perspective, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court correctly ascertained the archaic legislative intent behind 
today’s cartway statute.227  Its decision, however, renders the cartway 
statute incompatible with the development of transportation that has 
occurred throughout the twentieth century.228  The Daniel decision 
indicates that the cartway statute is due for legislative amendment.229 
 
 221. See Peasley v. State, 461 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1983) (recognizing an 
exception to New York’s general rule that water access precludes easements by necessity 
over land when the body of water has not been used as a highway for commerce and 
travel for many years). 
 222. See, e.g., Attaway v. Davis, 707 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ark. 1986) (finding it 
unreasonable to require travel by boat when today even travel of short distances is most 
always by motor vehicle). 
 223. Chandler Flyer, 592 P.2d at 388. 
 224. Hancock v. Henderson, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964) (acknowledging sound social 
policy reasons in allowing easements where land borders on navigable water). 
 225. BLEGEN, supra note 9, at 13. 
 226. Minnesota’s navigable rivers in fact penetrate every portion of the state.  
SCHMAHL, supra note 18, at 199. However, this has by no means hindered the continuous 
dependence on motorized vehicles.  In Minnesota, vehicle miles traveled per person have 
risen every year in the past two decades.  They increased 53% between 1980 and 2001. 
Minnesota Department of Administration, Minnesota Milestones: Measures that Matter, 
at http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/mm/indicator.html?Id=57 (last visited Dec. 6, 2003) 
(utilizing data from the Minnesota Department of Transportation to graph the increase in 
vehicle miles traveled by Minnesotans throughout the years). 
 227. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 228. The law must take into account changing conditions when it is applied to 
present-day problems.  See Redman v. Kidwell, 180 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965).  Access to property by boat may have been reasonable and practicable a century 
ago; today it is not.  Id. 
 229. A month after the Daniel decision, legislation was introduced in both the 
Minnesota House of Representatives and the Senate to remedy the court’s decision.  See 
H.R. B. 1303, 2003 83rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003) and S. B. 1137, 2003 
83rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003), available at http://www.leg.state.mn.us/ 
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Ramifications of the Daniel decision are likely to undulate 
throughout the state as water resources formulate a vital branch of not 
only the recreational industry, but Minnesotans’ pride.230  Had the court 
held any other way, it would have opened the floodgates to all lakeshore 
property owners to receive cartways across the adjoining land.  Any such 
decision would necessarily ripple throughout Minnesota’s massive 
acreage of lakefront property.231  The court, therefore, correctly refrained 
from imposing any such burden on Minnesotan property owners.  The 
legislature is the sole source of any statutory alteration that would have 
such resounding implications on Minnesota’s “10,000 lakes.”232 
 
 
leg/statutes.asp (last visited Dec. 6, 2003).  Both the House and Senate bills proposed 
amending the cartway statue to read “who has no access thereto except over a navigable 
waterway or over the lands of others.”  Id.  The Senate bill was introduced first, and was 
prompted by the Minnesota Department of Transportation in response to the 
ramifications of the Daniel decision.  E-mail to author from John Pollard of the Senate 
Transportation Policy and Budget Division (July 24, 2003) (on file with author).  The 
Senate bill currently resides in the Transportation Policy and Budget Division.  Id.  The 
House bill currently resides in the Transportation Policy Committee, where it has not 
been considered but is pending for hearing during the remainder of the legislative session.  
E-mail to author from Chuck Norenberg, Ways and Means Comm. Administrator, 
Minnesota House of Representatives (July 23, 2003) (on file with author). 
 230. TESTER, supra note 8, at 223.  “Lakes are like sparkling jewels in their effect on 
humans and in their contribution to Minnesota’s environment.”  Id.  This explains why 
Minnesotans spend nearly 25% of their recreational hours fishing, swimming, or boating.  
Id. 
 231. Lake Vermillion is only one of Minnesota’s 11,842 lakes, and alone has 2653 
improved properties, of which 29% (760) have water access only.  Appellant’s Brief, 
supra note 81, at 11. 
 232. “A lake is the landscape’s most beautiful and expressive feature; it is the earth’s 
eye.  Looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature.  The 
fluviatile trees next the shore are the slender eyelashes which fringe it, and the wooded 
hills and cliffs around are its overhanging brows.”  HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 
186 (J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., Princeton, 1971). 
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